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It is widely believed that policymakers and populations that have endured costly wars are reluctant to initiate fresh bouts of conflict, or even to use armed force as an instrument of policy. Historical examples of this form of war-weariness are plentiful. Nonetheless, little compelling evidence of the phenomena has been found in the quantitative international relations literature. This study reassesses war-weariness theory and lends it further empirical support. To test the paper's central hypothesis, chi-square tests of 510 interventions included in the International Military Intervention data set from 1946 to 1996 are employed. It is found that actors that have won a series of more than two wars initiate foreign military interventions significantly more often than their counterparts that have lost a string of wars. Put simply, a state's past record in warfare does impact subsequent decisions to intervene militarily.

INTRODUCTION

After draining military conflicts, policymakers and populations may have a natural inclination to avoid further military encounters. The United States, for example, refrained from military intervention abroad for the better part of a decade following the Vietnam War. Wiarda (1996:39) maintains that the United States simply “lost its nerve, its willingness to get involved in international affairs” during this period. Decision-makers and a substantial proportion of the population in the Soviet Union seem to have similarly lost their nerve for a period after the conflict in Afghanistan, as did a number of British and French leaders in the wake of the carnage of the First World War. Less conspicuous cases of war-weariness abound.

Despite a bevy of such historical examples, the quantitative international politics literature has found little consistent evidence of war-weariness. As a result, scholars in that field tend to heed the advice Garnham proffered a decade and a half ago in a study of United States, British, and French war propensities. Garnham (1986:287) asserted that

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1 I would like to thank David B. Robertson, Kisangani Emizet, James Wilson and three anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments on this paper.
there is "... no statistical evidence that war-weariness has constrained ... conflict behavior ... [in] the nineteenth and twentieth centuries." Consequently, he (1986:287) concluded that "... there is no basis for a continued effort to confirm this hypothesis." Obviously, this study does not follow his recommendation. To some extent, then, it breaks with convention in the field of quantitative international politics. It assumes that the gulf between the historical literature and the quantitative literature demonstrates the need not only for further research on this topic, but also for further attempts to hone theory. By drawing attention to a significant, but to date largely overlooked, refinement in existing theory, this paper finds empirical evidence of war-weariness. The refinement distinguishes victors from vanquished, emphasizing the importance of consecutive war victories and defeats.

Although there can be little doubt that the experiences in Vietnam and in Afghanistan left deep imprints on many policymakers in Washington and in Moscow respectively, this study argues that a single failure in war stands less chance of conveying significant lessons to decision-makers than a string of war losses. Instead of learning from a lone defeat, leaders may be tempted to emphasize the role that chance played in the outcome or to shift the blame in other ways. Following a second devastating setback in war, however, lessons may be more difficult to avoid. They become nearly inescapable after a third defeat or a fourth. In other words, while war-weariness might not set in following a single crushing defeat, it may be the norm in states that have endured calamity after calamity on the field of battle. Of course, actors that have won a number of wars in succession assimilate lessons as well. But the lessons that they learn can be expected to diverge sharply from those accepted by their vanquished foes.

To evaluate the relationship between war outcomes and subsequent uses of military force, this study examines the impact that consecutive war wins and consecutive war losses have on a state's propensity to intervene militarily. Empirical analysis centers on a series of chi-square tests of foreign military intervention frequencies from 1946 to 1996. Three intervention populations are analyzed: aggregate interventions, or all cases recorded; cases hostile to the target government; and cases supportive of the target government. Before these tests and their results can be discussed, the theoretical framework of the study must be described. The following section of the paper summarizes the theoretical literature on war-weariness. The third section reviews the findings from previous empirical studies, while the fourth presents the paper's hypothesis and operationalizes the dependent and independent variables. The fifth describes the empirical outcomes, and conclusions are drawn in the paper's final section.
WAR-WEARINESS THEORY

Philosophers, policymakers, and scholars have long recognized that, as Levy and Morgan (1986:26) observe, "there are good theoretical reasons for expecting that . . . a state's tendency toward war or perhaps even the use of force short of war may be tempered by a recent war experience." Decision-makers and much of the populace may grow to abhor interstate conflict, even the use of military force more generally, after witnessing the horror and the devastation that accompanies war. Once this sentiment takes hold, political leaders can be expected to strive to prevent the state from becoming involved in further interstate violence. Toynbee (1954:322) provides perhaps the most oft-cited rendering of the argument:

It is manifest that the survivors of a generation that has been of military age during a bout of war will be shy, for the rest of their lives, of bringing a repetition of this tragic experience either upon themselves or upon their children, and that therefore the psychological resistance to any move toward the breaking of a peace that the living memory of a previous war has made so precious is likely to be prohibitively strong.

In Toynbee's formulation, however, a generational dynamic outweighs specific episodes of war-weariness. He maintains that generations born in peace will have difficulty assimilating the lessons of war. They will repeatedly test the waters of combat until the next generation assumes power exhausted from battle and reluctant to bear arms. As a consequence, Toynbee's well-known version deviates from the central thrust of the theory, an irony that underscores an important point. War-weariness theory is underdeveloped.

One example of the rudimentary nature of common formulations of the theory is the tendency to assume that all nations emerge weary from war (beyond Toynbee, 1954; see Richardson, 1960). This supposition overlooks the fact that policymakers in winning and losing states often learn very different lessons from conflict. War tends to wreak far more havoc in vanquished states. They may have more industrial infrastructure and arid land laid waste, have a higher proportion of the population slain, and be burdened with occupation forces, an externally imposed government, or a failed government (see Thompson, 1993; Werner, 1996). Given the tremendous toll warfare has taken upon their societies, decision-makers in defeated states may be reluctant to use military force for years after the conflict. Large segments of the population will likely share their apprehension. A preference for peaceful solutions to interstate problems may even take root within foreign policy bureaucracies, helping to guide foreign relations over the course of decades.
The lessons assimilated by victorious peoples and policymakers may be starkly different. Instead of suffering from conflict, they might have reaped considerable rewards. Enhanced international prestige assumably follows victory in war, and the state may gain resource-rich lands and other spoils. For these and other reasons, winning states might emerge from warfare conflict-prone rather than conflict-weary. As Cashman (2000:154) explains, "the winning state's physical capabilities might be enhanced as the result of victory; victory might raise levels of nationalistic fervor and create a climate of optimism about war; it might solidify in power (or bring to power) a 'hawkish' political faction identified with the success of the war; or it might reinforce a cultural norm of aggression."2

Of course, this logic may not always hold. A victorious war might drain a state's economy, making further military ventures improbable. A harsh defeat might generate a desire for revenge throughout society, particularly if important territories or trade routes are lost. Moreover, vanquished states are rarely permanently weakened (see Organski and Kugler, 1977). They may rise to again challenge victors in combat, as 1930's Germany underscores. Thus, drawing a distinction between war winners and losers may not always be a fruitful research strategy. It is more likely to be, however, when the collective impact of consecutive war victories and consecutive war defeats is considered. Nevin (1996:101) was the first to highlight the "cumulative effects of winning or losing a succession of wars . . ." In doing so, he provided a subtle, yet significant, refinement to war-weariness theory.

Cumulative effects are important because a single defeat, even a devastating defeat, can be written off as an aberration. Obstinate or feeble-minded leaders may ignore obvious lessons following a setback in war, as Toynbee suggests policymakers from "peace-bred" generations do. It is more difficult to dismiss the lessons that flow from repeated costly and embarrassing war defeats. As war losses mount, it can be assumed that substantial portions of the political elite and the masses will gradually become convinced that there are better ways to achieve the nation's goals than the seemingly futile use of military force. Even if the desire for revenge

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2 There are a number of other explanations for states' reluctance or willingness to use armed force in world politics. Cashman (2000) summarizes them well. Given its focus on reexamining war weariness theory, a review of the voluminous literature on such alternative explanations and the various causes of conflict is beyond the scope of this paper. If war-weariness theory is lent empirical support by this and subsequent analyses, future research should compare it with competing middle range theories.
never fully dissipates among scattered groups in society, most will conclude that the costs associated with retribution are too high. Consequently, actors that have suffered a series of war defeats will be reluctant to use armed force as an instrument of foreign policy.

Decision-makers in this situation experience a form of negative reinforcement. They try to avoid behavior that proved disastrous in the past. In contrast, Nevin (1996) contends that policymakers and populations in states that have accumulated a string of war victories are positively reinforced. Military forays have almost always resulted in positive gains for these actors, and it is widely assumed that they will continue to do so. Success on the battlefield has been so common that failure is practically inconceivable. For these reasons and reasons previously discussed, decision-makers in victorious states may become increasingly receptive to ideas about deploying armed forces abroad, and even to launching wars.

A second, related literature, that on foreign policy learning, confirms the significance of cumulative effects. Reiter (1996:20-1) defines learning as “the application of information derived from past experiences to facilitate the understanding of a particular policy question.” Victory and defeat in war obviously have the potential to inform future policy.

The literature on foreign policy learning is both voluminous and conceptually divergent (Levy, 1994). A prominent thread running through much of this work, however, is an emphasis on the cumulative effects of repeated events. As Tetlock (1991:30, 27) observes, “Policymakers reappraise basic premises only after repeated failures . . . [because they], like ordinary mortals, see the world through a glass darkly – through the simplified images they create of the international scene” [italics mine]. Learning theories maintain that decision-makers rely on cognitive structures – analogies, operational codes, schemata, worldviews – to prioritize and order incoming information and to make inferences about the environment (Bennett, 1999). Since these structures shape what leaders see in the world, information that does not correspond with them is discounted. Only a flood of contradictory evidence will convince policymakers to reconsider their cognitive structures, and the policies that such structures helped to forge.3

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3 This is not to say that foreign policy learning cannot be an incremental process. Detailed studies of foreign policymakers demonstate that both incremental and more discontinuous learning — that after repeated failures — can occur simultaneously (see Rosati, 1995). But “events that have great impact, such as great successes and great failures,” which are often termed formative events, seem to be a prerequisite for alterations in basic policy tenets (Reiter, 1996:36; Tetlock, 1991).
Stoessinger (1993:210) captures this phenomenon pithily when he asserts that "people abandon their bad habits only when catastrophe is close at hand. We must be shaken, almost shattered, before we change." Since war carries such profound consequences for decision-makers and for nations, the former can be expected to be shaken after a decisive war loss. They may well be shattered after a series of war defeats. A serious reevaluation of the armed forces' usefulness as a foreign policy tool will be inevitable.

A final theoretical detail must be noted. War-weariness theory has relevance for the initiation of war and force short of war but not for the involvement in such activities. Nations that endure one crushing war defeat after another may be reluctant to initiate conflict, but that does not prevent them from being attacked. It may even make military assaults more likely. Oft-vanquished actors' economic and military capacities may be so drained that they are seen as easy prey. A perceived lack of resolve by their leadership may signal weakness to rivals pining to settle old scores. Thus, it is plausible that states that have suffered through multiple war defeats are involved in hostilities as frequently as other actors. But such episodes will rarely be of their own making.

PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

Empirical studies of war-weariness theory have produced mixed results to date.\(^4\) Garnham (1986) and Rasler and Thompson (1999) find no empirical evidence to support the theory. In his study of great power war from 1816 to 1965, Garnham maintains that vanquished states are as likely to initiate a future war as their victorious counterparts, and that no relationship exists between the severity of wars and the time elapsed until the next war. Rasler and Thompson include a state's past war record as a control variable in a broader study of war initiations. The control is not statistically significant.

Conversely, Singer and Small (1974) find that winners of interstate wars from 1816 to 1965 were more likely to initiate future wars than losers. They (1974:284) conclude that "victorious war begets war . . .," although they caution that their results are preliminary [italics in original]. As discussed, Nevin (1996) offers convincing evidence that successive victories

\(^4\) A number of studies focus on war participation rather than war initiation. Levy and Morgan (1986) and Most and Starr (1980) are examples.
or defeats are important predictors of future war initiation. He finds that countries that have won more than two consecutive wars are much more likely to initiate subsequent conflicts than actors that have lost a similar number of wars in succession. What is more, Nevin covers a broad temporal span by examining major wars from 1495 to 1815 and interstate wars from 1816 to 1990. Finally, Bennett (1999) provides the only previous analysis of the proclivity to intervene militarily after military successes or failures. In a longitudinal case study of Soviet/Russian interventionary activity from 1973 to 1996, he detects a cycle of positive and then negative reinforcement following Moscow's interventions. Perceived military successes in places like Vietnam and Angola in the 1970s convinced the Soviet leadership to intervene more frequently. By the late 1980s, the costs associated with conflict in Afghanistan taught the opposite lesson. As a result, the number of Soviet/Russian military interventions declined precipitously. In essence, Bennett demonstrates the cumulative impact that successful and failed military interventions had on the Russian leadership's willingness to use interstate force.

Although such recent analyses are compelling, the fact that empirical findings on war-weariness remain mixed suggests the need for further study. Like Nevin and Bennett, this paper employs a cumulative approach to reexamine war-weariness theory. It casts a wider analytical net than either of these studies, however. It goes beyond Bennett's (1999) work by examining a large sample of states. It goes beyond Nevin's (1996) article by analyzing a broad array of military actions. As important, this paper presents a more demanding empirical test of the linkages between actors' cumulative war records and the use of interstate military force.

HYPOTHESIS AND MEASUREMENT

This study contends that a state's prior experience in warfare affects more than just its willingness to engage in large-scale conflicts. Such experience impacts popular and elite perceptions of the role that the armed forces should play in foreign policy. Every decision to use military force is potentially influenced by an actor's war record, no matter how small the mission.

One concept that encompasses a wide range of military activity is foreign military intervention. The most limited overt military missions that

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5 Nevin is a psychologist. His article does not acknowledge the consensus that emerged some time ago on war-weariness in the quantitative international relations field.
cross state borders fall under the rubric of foreign military intervention, as do full scale wars. At the very least, a foreign military intervention may represent a step along the path toward war. Thus, this paper focuses on actors' war records and their willingness to intervene militarily. Given Nevin's (1996) findings, particular attention is given to actors that have won three or more successive wars and those that have lost an equal number sequentially.

The preceding discussion can be summarized succinctly in one hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: States that have lost more than two consecutive wars initiate foreign military interventions significantly less often than states that have won more than two consecutive wars.

This hypothesis is presumed to hold regardless of the type of military intervention examined, whether it is designed to bolster the target government's armed forces or oppose them. Of course, empirical analysis must determine its veracity. The following paragraphs define and then operationalize this study's dependent and independent variables, after which the paper's empirical results are presented.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Foreign Military Intervention

Data for the dependent variable are found in the International Military Intervention (IMI) data set assembled by Pearson and Baumann (1993-94). The collection records all verifiable instances when "troops or forces . . . cross borders . . . in pursuit of political or economic objectives," or when forces already based in a country are employed for such purposes (Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering, 1994:209). In essence, it catalogs cases when national military personnel are overtly and purposefully dispatched into other sovereign states, with the focus of this analysis being the initiation of the intervention. This paper extends the original data collection, which spanned the years 1946-1988, to 1996.6

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6 The Pearson-Baumann data set was carefully updated following the original coding guidelines. The sources used to expand the data set are detailed in Pickering (1999). The complete IMI data set includes 827 interventions from 1946 to 1996. Five hundred ten interventions remain once different forms of multinational intervention and actors without war records are excluded. Also, while the term foreign military intervention is used in this paper, Pearson and Baumann refer to the same phenomena as international military intervention. For present purposes, the terms are
IMI includes military missions ranging from the evacuation of nationals stranded in chaotic foreign lands, to operations to lend support to friendly, yet beleaguered, foreign governments, to brief border clashes, to all-out wars. In the IMI conceptualization, the single most important characteristic of a foreign military intervention is political authorization at the national level. Military intervention is considered first and foremost to be a policy tool, which is the result of a policy decision. Consequently, troops involved in training exercises and military advisors in other countries are excluded from the database. Their missions do not involve the direct application of military force, and they do not stem from political decisions to use armed forces to influence another actor. If, however, national decision-makers order soldiers engaged in exercises or advisors to rescue nationals overseas or to become active combatants, these troops immediately become participants in a foreign military intervention. Soldiers concentrated in bases, in transit, on leave, or transporting materials are omitted from the IMI collection for similar reasons.

The IMI data set is also sensitive to substantial changes in the level of military activity within ongoing missions. If an intervener's military involvement escalates significantly, as from air attacks to land invasion, a new intervention is catalogued. It has specific temporal guidelines as well. If an operation is halted for over six months only to have troops dispatched again, the latter deployment is considered a new intervention.

Such a conceptualization provides a fairly exhaustive inventory of foreign military interventions. Peceny (1999:560), for example, asserts that IMI provides the "most comprehensive list of cases" among current quantitative collections of military intervention. Kegley and Hermann (1997:81) note that IMI is "much broader" conceptually than one alternative, Tillema's (1994) overt military intervention data set. While Tillema concentrates on interventions that oppose the target government and that result in combat, IMI records a "wide range of [military] activities designed to penetrate and/or exercise influence over another state" (Kegley and Hermann, 1997:81). By analyzing IMI, this study determines if success or failure in war makes leaders more or less willing to deploy military forces as an instrument of foreign policy.

IMI has two further advantages. First, it is unique in extending well into the post-Cold War period. Second, it allows researchers to separate out and compare hostile and supportive interventions (see Hermann and Kegley, 1998; Peceny, 1999; Pickering, 1999). This is done by collapsing a six-category variable termed "direction of intervener" in IMI. If the intervention
neither directly supports nor opposes the target government, the original six-part variable is coded "0." It is coded "1" if the intervention is intended to support the target government; "2" if it opposes rebels or opposition groups; "3" if it is intended to oppose the target government; "4" if it supports rebel or opposition groups; "5" if it supports or opposes a third party government; and "6" if it supports or opposes rebel groups in a sanctuary. In this study, the IMI direction variable is streamlined into three categories: scores of "0" are considered neutral toward the target government; scores of "1" or "2" are considered supportive of the target government; and scores of "3" or "4" are considered hostile to the target government. Obviously, cases that were originally inventoried as either "5" or "6" are ambiguous in their intent toward the target government. As the data set was updated, these cases were reviewed and more recent sources were consulted to determine if they were neutral, supportive, or hostile. Four hundred thirty-nine of the 510 interventions (over 86%) analyzed in this study could be accurately coded in one of the three categories above.

It must also be noted that this study concentrates on unilateral interventions and multilateral interventions in which participating military forces remained under national command. Multinational interventions under unified commands, such as those taken under the auspices of the United Nations, are excluded. It is presumed that a past legacy of defeat in war is diluted when the operational burdens are shared among a handful of participants. Decisions about troop deployments weigh less heavily on national policymakers in this context. At the very least, they should have less apprehension about possible defeats or setbacks.

**INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: War Success**

The independent variable in this study is war success, or, more specifically, consecutive war wins and war losses. Information on war outcomes is gathered from the Correlates of War (COW) inventory of interstate wars from 1816 to 1997. The two wars coded as draws in the COW collection are treated as such, being considered neither victories nor defeats. The variable is lagged. The results of a war are included in the analysis the year after it ends. Also, because it is the collective weight of

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7 In particular, war outcomes were taken from the COW information available on the Peace Science Society website: [http://pss.la.psu.edu](http://pss.la.psu.edu). COW lists 79 wars from 1816 to 1997. Since each of these wars involves at least one state that is currently active in the international system, all 79 are included in this analysis.
past war outcomes that is hypothesized to affect intervention decisions, wars are inventoried over a considerably longer period than interventions.

To employ chi-square tests, the independent variable must be broken down into four categories. In this paper, the categories analyzed are: 3 or 4 consecutive wins; 1 or 2 consecutive wins; 1 or 2 consecutive losses; and 3 or 4 consecutive losses. No state in the sample records more than four war losses. The rare cases when an actor tallies more than four consecutive war wins are inventoried in the 3-4 consecutive win category. Nevin (1996) finds that the breakpoints between two and three successive wins and two and three successive losses are significant for understanding future war initiations. After these junctures, states' propensities for war begin to diverge. Decision-makers in states that have won three or more consecutive wars initiate wars more frequently than other actors. Their counterparts in states with three or more straight war losses almost never initiate wars. Focusing on these transition points should shed similar explanatory light on patterns of foreign military intervention.

DATA ANALYSIS

This paper postulates that actors that have lost a series of three or more wars will dispatch soldiers on interstate missions much less readily than actors that have won an equal number of wars in succession. As mentioned, chi-square tests are used to test this hypothesis. Since the structure of the international system changed fundamentally after the end of the Cold War, findings for the complete post-World War II period (1946-1996) and the post-Cold War period (1990-1996) are presented. Table 1 displays the results.

Significant differences in the interventionary behavior of multiple war winners and multiple war losers are evident. The intervention frequencies recorded by actors that have won 1 to 2 consecutive wars do not differ markedly from their counterparts with 1 to 2 successive war defeats. The same cannot be said for actors that have won 3 to 4 consecutive wars and those that have lost an equal number. Intervention totals for the former from 1946 to 1996 far exceed those for the latter, as the upper-left quadrant in Table 1 demonstrates. The gap between actors that have won three or more wars and those that have lost three or more remains when the analysis turns both to hostile interventions, or those that oppose the target government, and to supportive interventions, or those that lend assistance to the target government. The middle-left and lower-left quadrants of Table 1 present these findings. These differences are evident in the post-Cold
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<th></th>
<th>1946-1996</th>
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<th>1990-1996</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wins</td>
<td>Losses</td>
<td>Wins</td>
<td>Losses</td>
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<td>202</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 - 4 consecutive</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>(29)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 - 2 consecutive</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 - 4 consecutive</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>(19)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
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<td>10.33***</td>
<td>5.16*</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>(53)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
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<td>3 - 4 consecutive</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>18.91***</td>
<td>12.24**</td>
<td></td>
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* p < .05 level, ** p < .01 level, *** p < .001 level.

Note: Percentages for each 2 x 2 table are in parentheses. Fisher's exact test is used when any cell has five or fewer observations.
War era as well, as the two right-hand columns in Table 1 illustrate. If there is any discernable difference after 1989, it is that losers of one or two straight wars seem to be growing more hesitant to initiate military interventions.

Perhaps multiple winners' higher levels of activity reflect greater opportunities to intervene. Conceivably, there might be more states with winning records in warfare than losing records, and those on the winning side of the ledger might remain there for longer periods of time. If this were the case, the statistical differences reported in Table 1 would hold little meaning. Table 2 demonstrates that this is not the case. A single measure is needed to discern the varied intervention opportunities of states resting in the four categories analyzed in this study: state-years. Table 2 presents the total number of years that actors were positioned in each of these categories for the full period of this study, from 1946 to 1996, and for the post-Cold War period. As is apparent, more states have had winning records in war than losing records over the past fifty years, but the difference is not statistically significant. There are more war winners than losers in the post-Cold War period as well, but, again, the gap is statistically insignificant. Thus, opportunities do vary, but this variation is not substantial enough to explain the vast and statistically significant divergence between the interventional activities of states that have won three or more wars and those that have lost an equal number.

Of course, these results aggregate a number of different actors and military missions. Three states record four straight losses at some point in this sample, while six states record three straight losses. Egypt and Syria log the most state years in the four loss category, with policymakers in Cairo initiating the most interventions. Honduras, Hungary, and Jordan register the most state years in the three loss column. Honduras accounts for five of the twelve interventions launched by actors in this category, more than twice as many as any other actor. At the opposite end of the consecutive war wins - consecutive war losses continuum, Brazil and the Soviet Union record more state years than the three other actors with three war wins, while France and Israel initiate the most interventions in this category. Operations decided upon in Paris and in Jerusalem account for nearly 70% of the interventions in the three win column. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union account for the most state years in the four win column, with the US and the Soviet Union initiating the most interventions among four win states. That the superpowers intervened frequently during the Cold War is hardly surprising. More important is the fact that the basic relationship between war record and intervention initiations remained unchanged once the era of bipolar rivalry and proxy interventions had passed. This suggests that the results are not an artifact of the Cold War and heavy rates of
<table>
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<th>Table 2: War Outcomes and State Years.</th>
<th>1946-1996</th>
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<td>Wins</td>
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<td>1-2 consecutive</td>
<td>1575</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 consecutive</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>(7)</td>
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Note: Percentages for each 2 x 2 table are in parentheses.
superpower intervention. Moreover, the number of Israeli and Yugoslavian interventions suggest that they do not simply reflect the major powers' penchant for using armed force. An actor's cumulative war record seems to impact the intervention proclivities of both major and minor powers, and it has done so in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.8

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A host of factors affect a state's propensity to intervene militarily. This paper demonstrates that the shadow of the past is among them. Or, more specifically, it shows that the shadow cast by consecutive war victories and consecutive war defeats conditions states' interventionary behavior. Actors that have won a string of at least three wars use intervention as an instrument of policy significantly more often than their counterparts that have suffered a series of defeats. The pattern remains for both interventions hostile toward the target government and those supportive of it. This suggests that decision-makers in states that have won three or more successive wars often regard foreign military intervention as a practicable, perhaps even a propitious, foreign policy tool. A substantial portion of the population may hold similar beliefs. After all, the most consequential military forays in the past, wars, have tended to benefit the country. Large-scale military operations have more often than not enriched the state and

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8 As mentioned, major powers do not account fully for the intervention frequencies recorded in the 3-4 win category. Thirty-four percent (34%) of the interventions launched by actors with three consecutive war wins were undertaken by actors that cannot be considered major powers. Over 18% of the interventions initiated by four war winners were undertaken by states coded non-major powers by COW. Moreover, it should be expected that the bulk of the actors in the four win category are major powers. Major powers have in part achieved their positions in the international system through past success on the battlefield. Following the logic of this analysis, major power decisionmakers should be more willing to use military force than many counterparts because they have achieved positive gains in past military ventures. Thus, any major power variable coded will overlap conceptually with the independent variable in this study, war success. Statistical models that include both variables will be misspecified. This issue will be addressed in greater depth in future research. At present, however, the intervention frequencies of non-major powers with three and four consecutive wins provide confidence that the findings do not simply reflect the differing intervention proclivities of major and non-major powers.
enhanced its international prestige. Viewing the world from a perspective shaped by frequent success on the battlefield, policymakers in such states may gradually begin to assume that positive gains attend the use of military force. They can be expected to use it more often than other actors. States in the reverse situation also learn lessons. But leaders and populations in states that have been consistently bested on the field of battle have greater appreciation for the costs associated with the use of military force. As a result, they will likely prefer peaceful methods for achieving national goals.

Over time, such lessons become encoded in policymaking institutions. They will subsequently establish preferred frameworks for viewing events, inform organizational routines, and provide basic guidelines for planning (see Jervis, 1976:238). In other words, they help to shape the parameters of future policy. Actors on opposite ends of the consecutive war wins - consecutive war losses continuum can thus be expected to behave differently in a range of interstate interactions, for they have assimilated starkly divergent lessons on the use of armed force in world affairs.

These results lend empirical support to Hypothesis 1. What is more, this paper's findings confirm the importance of cumulative effects in studies of war-weariness. Intervention initiation rates vary little among actors that have won one to two straight wars and their counterparts that have lost an equal number consecutively. It is only when states accumulate further victories or defeats that intervention initiation frequencies begin to bifurcate. Cumulative successes or failures thus appear to weigh more heavily upon decision-makers contemplating the use of force than single, potentially idiosyncratic events.

In sum, this paper offers evidence that a state's history of either success or of failure in warfare impacts its proclivity to intervene militarily. Future research will have to uncover further nuances in the war record - military intervention relationship. At a minimum, such studies should control for a range of variables that have the potential to influence decisions to intervene. States' military capabilities, economic strength, regime type, and geopolitical environment might be among the variables considered. Also, subsequent studies should determine if the relationship is fully linear. Obviously, much remains to be done. This paper has nonetheless laid a necessary foundation for research on this topic. It demonstrates that a significant relationship exists between war outcomes and subsequent uses of military force. This finding has implications for policy. When decision-makers attempt to gauge whether or not a state might use military force in a given situation, they would be well advised to consider that state's past record in warfare.
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